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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to shed light on the distinctive role of the EU as a state-builder in 
the case of the Palestinian Territory and examine how state-building can be conducted in 
a still on conflict society. Following the Oslo Accords, the EU engaged actively in the 
state-building project in the Palestinian Territory taking a number of initiatives on the 
ground. Ever since, security has been at the centre of Israeli-Palestinian relations as well 
as at the international community‟s effort to build a state called “Palestine”. Security has 
been a key issue in all Israeli-Palestinian agreements concluded during the interim period 
up to 1999 and then, during the second intifada (2000), security became a cornerstone of 
all internationally-sponsored diplomatic initiatives and peace plans. Security also became 
synonymous with Palestinian statehood and it topped the diplomatic agenda in the recent 
re-launch of direct talks between Israelis and Palestinians on October 2, 2010. To this 
end, the central aim of this paper is to examine the distinctive initiatives that the EU has 
taken in order to help the Palestinian Authority reform both its security and judiciary 
sectors as part of its broader state-building strategy towards the Palestinian Territory, as 
well as provide explanations on why these policies had so little impact. In doing so, the 
paper seeks to provide answers to the following questions: what conclusions can we 
gather from a detailed study of EU initiatives on the ground? Has the EU been an 
effective and coherent actor in the Palestinian Territory as far as security and judiciary 
sector reform is concerned? How are all these initiatives on the ground linked to the 
“high politics” of this conflict?  
 
 
Keywords: European Union, Palestinian Territory, State-building, Security Sector 
Reform, Judiciary Sector Reform 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
Introduction
1
 
Following the Oslo Accords in 1993, the EU engaged actively in the state-
building project in the Palestinian Territory taking a number of initiatives on the ground. 
Ever since, security has been at the centre of Israeli-Palestinian relations as well as at the 
international community‟s effort to build a state called “Palestine”. Security has been a 
key issue in all Israeli-Palestinian agreements concluded during the interim period up to 
1999 and then, during the second intifada (2000), security became a cornerstone of all 
internationally-sponsored diplomatic initiatives and peace plans. Security also became 
synonymous with Palestinian statehood and it topped the diplomatic agenda in the recent 
re-launch of direct talks between Israelis and Palestinians on October 2, 2010 which were 
soon suspended. The importance of security sector reform was also acknowledged in the 
recently leaked Palestine papers.  
While the international community in general and the EU in particular have been 
involved in various attempts at „building‟ the Palestinian state the security sector reform 
(SSR) has attracted special attention because it is considered to be the „alpha and omega‟ 
of the state-building project and the key aspect of any eventual peace agreement between 
the two conflicting parties. Despite the fact that SSR is moving forward swiftly, 
especially under the guidance of the emergency government of Salam Fayyad which was 
established in 2007, the degree of parliamentarian and democratic civilian oversight and 
accountability is minimal. Therefore, while institutions are being built and the PA has 
achieved tangible improvements with regard to security sector, the situation remains far 
from ideal. Thus, the situation which is witnessed today can be characterized as ironic 
and paradoxical; on the one hand the EU expects the local actors to govern in accordance 
with the principle of good governance and the rule of law while on the other hand the EU 
itself does not feel obliged to adhere to the very same principle. 
The paper is separated into six parts. It begins with an introduction to the concept 
of SSR, different definitions and approaches. The second part deals with the EU‟s 
approach with regard to SSR and the third part aims at offering a brief analysis of the 
                                               
1
  This article is based on the author’s ongoing PhD research project at the University of Warwick, UK, 
which is entitled “The EU’s Role in the Palestinian Territory after the Oslo Accords: The Politics of Stillborn 
State-building”. The author gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the University Association for 
Contemporary European Studies (UACES) whose travel grant made fieldwork for this research possible.   
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security sector in the Palestinian Territory, its establishment and evolution. The forth part 
analyses the two civilian missions that the EU has deployed in the Palestinian Territory in 
order to help the PA reform its security sector and the fifth part analyses the distinctive 
initiatives that the EU has taken with regard to Judiciary Sector Reform. The sixth part 
provides a critical assessment of the EU‟s initiatives and the last part offers some 
criticism on the EU‟s approach to SSR in the Palestinian Territory arguing that in reality, 
the EU has supported a technical and training approach rather than a genuine SSR 
process promoting democratic civilian oversight and accountability.  
 
 
 
1. The term and notion of Security Sector Reform 
 The term „security sector‟ is associated with different and often competing 
definitions, which include either a narrow or a broad set of actors. In the first case, 
„security sector‟ refers only to these state organizations which are authorized to use force. 
With respect to the broader definition, the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) suggested in 2002 a definition which also includes justice and law enforcement 
institutions, civil management oversight bodies, non-statutory security forces and civil 
society groups (UNDP 2002: 87).  
 The emergence over the 1990s of the concept of security sector reform (SSR) has 
its roots in the focus of Western governments and development agencies on „poverty 
reduction‟ in developing countries and in the introduction of the concept of „human 
security‟ in the 1994 Human Development Report published by the UNDP. This shift, 
reflected a growing awareness that the conventional focus on military threats overlooks 
“broader security concerns affecting a wider range of societal groups…and that security 
institutions significantly affect national prospects for social and economic progress” 
(Sayigh 2007b: 4).  
 Consequently, although there is a general agreement on the need for SSR in state-
building projects, an important difference remains on whether SSR‟s main objective 
should be to improve the physical security of people or to improve democratic control 
over the security sector. This difference has lead to a variation of terms defining SSR. 
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While some analysts prefer to use the term „transformation‟ rather than reform (Cooper 
and Pugh 2002), the UNDP‟s Crisis Prevention and Recovery Bureau uses the term 
„justice and security sector reform‟. The OECD DAC defines „security sector reform‟ as 
“the transformation of this sector so that it is managed and operates in a manner that is 
more consistent with democratic norms, the rule of law including well-functioning and 
just judicial and prison systems, and sound principles of governance” (Friendrich and 
Luethold 2007: 16).  
 As a result, most of the writers on SSR now recognize its holistic nature. Gross 
for example states that SSR should embrace both „pure‟ security arrangements such as 
defence, police and judicial reform but also democracy, human rights and good 
governance (Gross 2009: 9).The presence of effective security structures, which are 
democratic and transparent, forms the key to sustained development. Without security a 
state can achieve neither development nor democracy, stability or peace. As Winkler puts 
it:  
 
Democracy cannot develop if the population knows that the security apparatus is 
not under firm political and democratic control. If the security sector remains like 
an iceberg…then democracy cannot flourish, human rights, dignity and security 
are in jeopardy, and the road to good governance, socioeconomic development 
and the rule of law is blocked  (Winkler 2002: 8). 
 
 
Despite these differences, there is a broad agreement on an inclusive list of main 
areas of activity and general principles of SSR. In the first category, according to DAC 
the SSR-related activities are defined as followed: 1) Political and Policy Dialogue, 2) 
Armed Forces and Intelligence, 3) Justice and Internal Security Apparatus, 4) Non-state 
Security Forces, 5) Civil Oversight Mechanisms, 6) Civil Management Bodies, 7) 
Civilian Capacity Building, 8) Regional Initiatives and 9) Initiatives to Demilitarize 
Society (OECD 2004: 31). The internationally recognized principles for external support 
for SSR include the following: 1) the adoption of a broad definition of the security sector, 
2) situate SSR in the context of providing a secure environment for people, 3) recognize 
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that all countries can benefit to varying degrees from SSR, 4) foster local ownership of 
reform processes, 5) develop comprehensive frameworks for promoting SSR and assist 
reforming countries to develop their own frameworks, 6) build capacity to undertake SSR 
in reforming countries, 7) adopt a long-term approach and 8) adopt a regional/sub-
regional perspective (DfID 2004: 2). 
 However, David Chuter objects that all these definitions of the security sector and 
its reform “make any serious SSR program impossibly large and complex, and turn SSR 
questions themselves into more general questions of „governance‟” (quoted in Sayigh 
2007b: 5). Chuter defines the security sector as consisting “of all those institutions whose 
primary role is the provision of internal and external security, together with bodies 
responsible for their administration, tasking and control. In practice, this means the 
military, the police, the intelligence services, paramilitary forces and the government 
agencies responsible for them” (Chuter 2006: 7). This definition will be used for the main 
part of this paper because a governance and development perspective seems more 
efficient for this research. The reason for this is that in the Palestinian context, where the 
role of non-statutory actors is of big importance and there is a still ongoing state 
formation process underway, a narrow definition of the security sector would fail to 
explain and understand the forces that shape it.     
  
 
2. The EU’s approach to Security Sector Reform  
 The argument that the EU should start developing guidelines on SSR gained 
prominence in 2000. Thus, in 2003 the EU recognized that it had all the instruments at its 
disposal in order to adopt a clear strategy which would enable the serving of its strategic 
interests and objectives; the European Security Strategy (ESS). The ESS states that 
“…none of these threats is purely military [and] each requires a mixture of instruments” 
and “as we increase capabilities in the different areas, we should think in terms of a wider 
spectrum of missions. This might include joint disarmament operations, support for third 
countries in combating terrorism and security sector reform. The last of these would be 
part of a broader institution building” (European Council 2003: 12).  
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 To this end, SSR was linked to institution and state-building as well as conflict 
prevention and conflict resolution. Although the original ESDP did not mention SSR, a 
subsequent „Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of ESDP‟ was adopted so as to coordinate 
the EU activities on SSR (Sedra 2006: 327). The ESS was also complemented by more 
specific reports on SSR and texts on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration 
(DDR). These include the EU Concept for ESDP support to Security Sector Reform, the 
„European Consensus‟ of 2005 which links development with security, the Council 
Conclusions of June 2006 on a Policy framework for SSR and the EU Concept for 
support to Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) approved by the 
Council of the European Union in December 2006. 
 Another important document came in 2006. On 24 May the European 
Commission sent a Communication to the Council and the European Parliament entitled 
„A Concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform‟ which was 
accompanied by a Staff Working Document containing annexes on EC Policy relevant 
for support in the Area of SSR, areas of European Community Support to SSR, the 
European Commission Programming cycle and examples of international standards 
relevant for supporting the area of SSR. (European Commission 2006).  
 The European Commission, in its Communication adopted the term „security 
system reform‟ rather than the term „security sector reform‟. By this, the Commission 
made clear that it conceives the reform process not only as a pure reform of those state 
institutions that provide individual services such as the military, the police, the judicial 
institutions etc but also as an holistic approach, strengthening security for all citizens and 
focusing “on the overall functioning of the security system as part of governance reform 
policy and strategy of the public sector” (ibid.). Based on the OECD-DAC definition, the 
security system was defined as all those „state institutions and other entities with a role in 
ensuring the security of the state and its people‟ (ibid.). Four main categories were 
presented as constituting the security system: 
 The core security actors such as armed forces, police, gendarmeries, paramilitary 
forces, presidential guards, intelligence services, coast guards, border guards, 
customs authorities, reserve or local security units.  
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 Security Management and oversight bodies such as the Executive, including 
ministries of defence, internal affairs and foreign affairs, the Legislative 
including the parliament and the legislature, national security advisory bodies, 
customary and traditional authorities, financial management bodies, and civil 
society including the media, academia and NGOs. 
 Justice Institutions such as the judiciary, Ministry of Justice, prisons, criminal 
investigation and prosecution services, human rights commissions and 
ombudsmen, customary and traditional justice systems, implementation justice 
services (bailiffs and ushers). 
 Non-statutory security forces such as liberation armies, guerilla armies, private 
bodyguard units, private security companies etc.  
   
Apart from the second pillar and ESDP, the EU can also lean on its remaining two 
pillars in order to address the issue of SSR, through the external relations‟ competences 
of the Community pillar (first pillar) and the external aspects of Justice and Home Affairs 
policies (third pillar) (Weiler 2009: 6). More specifically, the „aim and content‟ of the 
action is what determines the framework for EU intervention; if a developmental, general 
rule of law or institutional strengthening role is pursued then the European Commission 
takes the leading role. If a security goal is to be achieved such as state failure, creating 
institutions from „scratch‟ or military mission then the European Council leads the 
„intervention‟ (European Commission Official, interview 20 May 2010).  This is the 
reason why the two civilian missions deployed in the PT are mainly under the Council‟s 
mandate while the Judiciary Sector Reform (JCR) which is part of the broader SSR 
strategy in the PT remains under the Commission‟s supervision. The split in competences 
of different missions between the European Commission and the European Council has a 
direct impact on policy implementation on the ground and coordination issues which will 
be analysed in the next part.      
 The EU seems to support the belief that the primary objective for the success of a 
state is the security sector. In contrast with other factors which are equally important, 
security is not something that can be built gradually but has to be present at the beginning 
of a new state. Security seems to be the „alpha and omega‟ in the state-building process 
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as in its absence, political, economic and cultural „building‟ would be impossible (Bouris 
2010b: 382). Moreover, the security sector reform is considered to be an action which 
supports structures “which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a 
relapse to conflict” (Boutros-Ghali 1992). This is the reason why the EU has deployed so 
many security forces across the world as an element of state-building; from the Western 
Balkans to Africa and from South Caucasus to the Middle East and Asia
2
. 
 
 
3. The Security Sector in the Palestinian Territory  
 The Palestinian internal security system has always been in disarray. Although it 
has never been highly functional, its efficiency has further been eroded though the years 
because of the destroying of facilities and killing of personnel. Prior to 1993 and the Oslo 
Accords, the Israeli government was the one responsible for the police force and the 
justice system in the Palestinian Territory. But since the Oslo Accords and the Agreement 
on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area signed in 1994, Palestinians were given a limited 
autonomy in the domain of internal security. 
 In 1995, under the Oslo II Agreement the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were 
divided into three areas; A, B and C. It was only in the Area A that the PA was given full 
administrative and security control
3
. In Area B which includes some 450 villages and 
cities of the West Bank the PA was only given civil control while Israel would maintain 
security control. Finally, in Area C Israel would retain full responsibility and control in 
all aspects. It should be noted that Area C constitutes almost 61 per cent of the total area 
of West Bank.     
 Trying to reform the Palestinian security forces was not an easy task as the Oslo 
years and Arafat‟s leadership combined with the outburst of the second intifada had left 
the security sector in a chaotic situation. According to the Palestinian Israeli Interim 
Agreement of 1995, the Palestinian police force was to be composed of six branches: 
Civil Police, Public Security Force, General Intelligence, Civil Defence, Preventative 
                                               
2  For details about all these operations see 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=268&lang=en  
3
  Area A includes the areas of Gaza and Jericho and seven major Palestinian populations centers namely 
Nablus, Kalkilya, Tulkarem, Ramallah, Bethlehem, Jenin and Hebron. Special arrangements about Hebron 
were concluded in January 1997.  
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Security and Presidential Security (The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip 1995: Annex I). In reality though, more branches existed, 
which instead of providing security to the Palestinians resulted in developing capabilities 
with the aim of threatening Israel. In 2002, George Bush made clear to the PA that 
statehood would be synonymous with reform of security forces. More specifically he 
argued that  
 
Palestinian Authorities are encouraging, not opposing, terrorism. This is 
unacceptable. The United States will not support the establishment of a 
Palestinian state until its leaders engage in sustained fight against terrorists and 
dismantle their infrastructure. This will require an externally supervised effort to 
rebuild and reform the Palestinian security services (Bush 2002). 
  
His argument was adopted by the Quartet one year later and the demand for 
reforming the Palestinian security forces was repeated with the “Performance-based Road 
Map to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict”. The Quartet, 
demanded that  
 
all Palestinian security organizations are consolidated into three services reporting 
to an empowered Interior Minister [and] rebuilt and refocused Palestinian 
Authority security apparatus begins sustained, targeted, and effective operations 
aimed at confronting all those engaged in terror and dismantlement of terrorist 
capabilities and infrastructure (Quartet 2003). 
 
 Until his death in 2004, Yasser Arafat, operating under a „divide and conquer‟ 
strategy “built his forces in such a way that only he could arbitrate between them, giving 
none of them enough power to threaten his regime” (Luft 2004: 1). Although Arafat did 
some steps in reforming the Palestinian security services this effort “was at best 
cosmetic” (ibid.: 31). He supported the reducing of Palestinian forces and restructuring of 
the police and he also appointed Gen. Abdel Razak al-Yahya as an Interior Minister to 
oversee the coordination of security forces. But although he removed some of his key 
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people from the security establishment this removal was not made because of their bad 
record but due to their popular support which could have challenged his rule. The new 
appointees were not those who would be capable of restructuring and reforming the 
Palestinian security forces but people who were linked to terrorist organizations in the 
Palestinian Territory such as Rashid Abu-Shabak and Mahmoud Damara (ibid.). 
Consequently, Arafat lost the chance to make a real security sector reform by appointing 
people who would not threaten his regime and were closely linked with terrorism.  
 Unfortunately, the situation did not improve dramatically after Arafat‟s death and 
Abbas‟ taking office. Although Abbas made some positive steps towards reforming the 
security forces in the framework of the Roadmap these initiatives did not prove to be 
enough while at the same time, Israel seemed unwilling to do any positive steps and 
respect its obligations under the Roadmap. The situation deteriorated after the 2006 
elections which brought Hamas to the power. Although Hamas signed the reconciliation 
Mecca Accord and agreed to a power-sharing arrangement with Fatah, the US and Israel 
seemed unwilling to accept this fragile balance. Thus, US promoted the training of 
battalions of National Security Forces (NSF) and Presidential Guards (PG) which were 
loyal to President Mahmoud Abbas, at the Jordan International Police Training Center 
(JIPTC) outside Amman. Israel on the other hand, allowed them to return to the West 
Bank where they deployed and started imposing security measures mainly against Hamas 
supporters. As Friendrich and Luethold argue:  
 
By establishing security forces outside governmental and parliamentary control, 
the US not only ignored principles of good practice for SSR assistance, but also 
helped create the conditions which led to the bloody clashes in the Gaza Strip in 
2006 and 2007 and the subsequent takeover of the Strip by Hamas (Friendrich and 
Luethold 2008: 195) 
 
When Mohammad Dahlan, one of the strongest Fatah men, was put in charge in 
order to coordinate the deployment of Fatah forces at various crossings around Gaza, 
Hamas responded violently and took over Gaza. Abbas responded by calling this action 
coup d‟etat, declared a „state of emergency‟ and appointed Salam Fayyad as Prime 
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Minister. Since then two governments both considering themselves as the legitimate 
representatives exist in the Palestinian Territory; the one under Salam Fayyad in the West 
Bank and the other under Ismail Haniya in Gaza. The latter on June 16, 2007 declared 
Said Fanuna as the new security Chief in the Gaza Strip while Kamal el-Sheikh of Fatah 
was nominated as the police Chief in the West Bank.  
 To sum up, the security situation in the Palestinian Territory has always been in 
disorder and has long remained an externally-led reform process which several times 
made things more complicated without taking local ownership into account. For example, 
the Roadmap as well as previous agreements and workplans responded mainly to US and 
Israeli security concerns rather than Palestinian needs and demands. The Roadmap does 
not demonstrate at any point “concern for the security services that Palestinian security 
forces will have to provide for Palestinians themselves” (ibid.: 200). Moreover, the 
context in which SSR is taking place in the PT should not be neglected either. 
Palestinians are expected to reform their Security Sector under continuous occupation 
and without having control over their boarders, airspace and seaspace. Within the West 
Bank Israeli restrictions such as checkpoints, travel restrictions and the Wall further 
complicate the situation. 
 
 
4. The EU and Security Sector Reform in the Palestinian Territory 
As mentioned above, the security sector has attracted only recently EU attention 
because of the fact that “rapid Palestinian economic revival is essential...but it will only 
come true if there is a drastic improvement in the security environment” (World Bank 
2005: i). Recognizing the importance of an efficient security sector, the EU has deployed 
two missions in the Palestinian Territory; the first is a police mission named EUPOL 
COPPS which aims at supporting the Palestinian Authority in establishing effective 
policing arrangements and the second a border assistance mission named EUBAM Rafah. 
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4.1 European Union Police Co-ordination Office for Palestinian Police Support 
(EUPOL COPPS) 
EUPOL COPPS was established upon request from the PA which needed support 
in taking responsibility for law and order and, in particular, in improving its capacity in 
civil police and law enforcement (European Union Council Secretariat 2009b). Referring 
to this, the Ministry of Interior in Palestine argued that “a professionally trained and self 
sufficient Palestinian Civil Police is the corner stone of law and order leading to a secure 
and independent Palestinian state” (Palestinian Ministry of Interior 2008: 1). While the 
mission had a three year mandate and started its operation in January 2006 it was 
extended two times: in 2008 until 31 December 2010 and in 2010 until 31 December 
2011 (Council of the European Union 2010). Its main tasks are threefold; to assist the 
Palestinian Civil Police mentoring and advising it, to co-ordinate and facilitate EU 
member financial assistance to the Palestinian Civil Police and to give advice on 
politically related Criminal Justice elements (European Council 2005b). As a result, 
“EUPOL COPPS is an expression of the EU‟s continued readiness to support the 
Palestinian Authority in complying with its Roadmap obligations, in particular with 
regard to „security‟ and „institution building‟” (ibid.).  
Following the Berlin Conference in Support of Palestinian Civil Security and 
Rule of Law (June 2008), EUPOL COPPS has expanded its mission so as to include a 
rule of law component in order to establish a more comprehensive approach to security 
for Palestinians (EUPOL COPPS Information Brochure 2009). The rule of law section, 
after producing a comprehensive Assessment Report on the Palestinian Criminal Justice 
System, is trying to address the most important actors in the „criminal chain‟: 
prosecution, courts, High Judicial Council, Penitentiary, Ministry of Justice (MoJ), the 
Bar Association, Civil Society (NGOs) and the scientific legal community (law faculties). 
By this, “we have adopted a really comprehensive approach to SSR always in partnership 
with Palestinian stakeholders and in close co-ordination with other international 
stakeholders” says a rule of law expert (EUPOL COPPS Headquarters, interview 28 May 
2010). EUPOL COPPS has helped rapidly professionalize the civil police in the West 
Bank which now numbers over 7000 officers and has demonstrated an important 
capability in maintaining public order. EUPOL COPPS is also helping the civil police 
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develop more sophisticated crime investigation techniques and Canada is expanding the 
PA's forensic capabilities.  
Insofar, despite some serious difficulties faced during its establishment, EUPOL 
COPPS is seen as “a good success story” (Berger, interview 14 May 2010). Except for 
Brussels, Israeli officials also seem to be fairly satisfied by the mission arguing that  
“EUPOL COPPS has been very successful until now. There are very positive remarks 
and the improvement of the security in the West Bank has been translated to our removal 
of checkpoints which helps the improvement of the Palestinian economy” (Assaraf, 
interview 12 May 2010). 
 However, the operational challenges of the mission that commenced in January 
2006 (just a few days before Hamas‟ electoral victory in the Palestinian Legislative 
elections) should not be neglected. Consequently, in the words of a EUPOL COPPS 
official: “from our first days in the mission we were hostages of the political situation 
without being able to do our job” (EUPOL COPPS Headquarters, interview 28 May 
2010). The mission resumed its operations after the establishment of the Salam Fayyad 
government in June 2007 and since then “Palestinians have started witnessing a massive 
change in their security” (Ozreil, interview 29 May 2010).  
Except for providing training, EUPOL COPPS has made tangible contributions to 
equipment, infrastructure and assessment (Bulut 2009: 291). One of the most important 
achievements is the Jericho Police Training School in which the UK Department for 
International Development (DFID) also played an important role by providing $409.000 
out of the total $545.000 for its first phase (CITpax: 20). The Jericho Police Training 
School constitutes a really useful tool in the hands of the Palestinian Civil Police as far as 
training is concerned. As an official from the Palestinian Civil Police argued “we now 
have the ability to train our people for free without having to pay everything that include 
their training in Egypt or Jordan; we have the ability to recruit and train our 
policemen...that‟s what local ownership means” (Ozreil, interview 29 May 2010).  
Although it is true that the security situation in the West Bank has been improved, 
it still remains far from ideal even if in the words of current Israeli Defense Minister 
“2010 has proven to be the quietest in many years in terms of Israel's security” (Haaretz, 
2011). At least eight major and possibly as many as eighteen smaller different Palestinian 
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security services are active in the West Bank at the moment (Persson 2010: 50). The eight 
major security services include: a) General Intelligence, b) Military Intelligence, c) 
National Security Forces, d) Palestinian Civil Defense, e) Palestinian Civil Police, f) 
Palestinian Navy, g) Presidential Guard and h) Preventive Security. Some labor division 
exists between the EU and the US which is a blue-green division, where the EU assists 
civil security structures and more specifically the Palestinian Civil Police, while the US 
assists militant security structures such as the Palestinian National Security Forces and 
the Presidential Guard.  
 Esra Bulut argues that the EU trained PCP is considered to be the least abusive 
(Bulut 2009: 295). The EU seems to have made a wise choice training the civil police as 
this is less controversial than reforming intelligence services or the militant security 
forces. At the same time it is less political and in general people tend to applaud efforts to 
combat crimes and other ordinary police services (International crisis Group 2010: 13). 
Neil Page, an advisor to the US Security Coordinator General Keith Dayton (now 
replaced by Lt. Gen. Michael Moeller) argues to Anders Persson “in ideal circumstances, 
we would probably not have started with three intelligence services but we are not 
dealing with Sweden or Finland here, so it is important to recognize things are not always 
done the way we are doing it at home” (quoted in Persson 2010: 50).  
 
 
 
4.2 European Union Boarder Assistance Mission in Rafah (EUBAM Rafah) 
The second civil mission under the European Union‟s Security and Defence 
Policy is the European Union Border Assistance Mission Rafah (EUBAM Rafah) which 
was established after Israel‟s decision to withdraw from the Gaza Strip. On 15 November 
2005, Israel and the Palestinian Authority signed an „Agreement on Movement and 
Access‟ and six days later the Council of the EU welcomed the agreement and decided to 
undertake the third party role (after US unwillingness to do so) which meant that, 
together with Egypt, Israel and the PA, would be responsible for monitoring the Rafah 
border crossing point. “Nobody was really satisfied but we didn‟t have another option so 
we thought it would be good to give Europeans a role to play” says an Israeli official 
(Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, interview 12 May 2010). On the other hand, the EU 
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was also satisfied as for the first time it was given not the typical role of being a payer but 
the one on being an on-the-ground player. “We couldn‟t be there without Israel‟s 
permission” says an EU Council official (Council of the European Union, interview 3 
February 2010) but although Sharon signed the agreement “he was never really willing to 
implement it” (European Parliament, interview 12 February 2010). 
EUBAM Rafah started operating on 30 November 2005 and it sought to reconcile 
Israel‟s security concerns with both the Palestinian demands for an autonomous border 
management and the need for Gaza‟s economic recovery, which requires open borders 
(Del Sarto 2007: 71). The mission initially had a one year mandate which has been 
extended until now (European Council 2005a). Its main aims were to assist the PA to 
build capacity-training on border management and customs, to evaluate and access the 
PA‟s application of the procedures, to contribute to confidence building between the 
parties, to contribute to the building institutional capacity in the PA to ensure effective 
border control and to contribute to the liaison between the Palestinian, Israeli and 
Egyptian authorities in all aspects of border management at Rafah. 
Although supervising the Rafah border crossing is “neither a high-profile nor a 
particularly glorious task...the EU mission is nonetheless politically relevant” (Del Sarto 
2007: 71) and it has significance for EU-Israeli relations. Yossi Alfer argues that: 
 
When a guy like Ariel Sharon who had nothing but contempt for the Europeans, 
when he agrees…that there will be no Israelis at the Rafah crossing and there will 
be Europeans there, and to place this in the hands of the EU, this was an 
extraordinary breakthrough in European-Israeli relations, that Israel would show 
this degree of trust the first time, the first crossing between a Palestinian entity 
and a neighboring Arab state is going to be entrusted to the Europeans, that was 
really quite extraordinary (quoted in Persson 2010: 51). 
  
In the same line of the argument, a member of the European Parliament (MEP), 
argues that “with this civilian mission we were able to dismiss the Israeli reluctance 
for our presence and this mission can be used as an incentive to expand our 
international presence” (European Parliament, interview 2 March 2010). This 
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argument is also supported by Christian Berger, head of the European Commission 
Technical Assistance Office (ECTAO) in Jerusalem who supports the idea that “the 
example of Rafah and experience gained could be used in the future in other crossing 
points as well” (Berger, interview 14 May 2010).  
 The mission had some success until the Hamas‟s takeover of Gaza on June 13, 
2007
4
 as from the start of the Mission until the last day a total of 443,975 passengers 
crossed the border between the Gaza Strip and Egypt at the Rafah Crossing Point (RCP) 
(EUBAM Rafah 2010). A mission official argues that:  
 
Until its suspension EUBAM Rafah was the most successful ESDP mission. 
Visibility was really high and you could see development. If we were not there 
people who were depressed and desperate would not be able to cross. We were 
there not for our own sake but because we had the strong belief that, in contrast to 
the critic you mentioned [about Del Sarto‟s argument], doing human rights is a 
glorious task (EUBAM Rafah Headquarters, interview 13 May 2010). 
 
Since June 2007 EUBAM Rafah has declared a temporary suspension of 
operations at the Rafah Crossing Point because Israel blocked access to the EU observers 
following the abduction of Corporal Gilad Shalit by Palestinian militants (Sayigh 2007a: 
11) but it remains in the region with the operational capacity to deploy at short notice 
(European Union Council Secretariat 2009a). The total staff of the mission has 
significantly been reduced though. In July 2006, 81 staff from 16 different countries 
constituted the mission (CITpax 2006: 37) and in 2007 there was a 28 staff reduction (53 
officials) while 2 countries withdrew their support namely Austria and Luxemburg 
(Martinez, interview 13 May 2010). In 2008 only 18 international and 6 locals 
represented the personnel of the mission while in 2009 there was a light increase to 23 
international and 8 local staff (ibid.). As of June 2010, the mission was only constituted 
by 13 staff (Reigeluth and Bouris 2010).   
                                               
4
  From June 2006 until June 2007 the crossing was open 23.5 percent of the time which although not 
efficient is still something important so as to help the free movement (Lazaroff 2009). According to 
statistics, during the 18 months that the EUBAM was present a total of 443.975 passengers crossed 
through the Rafah Crossing Point (European Union Council Secretariat 2009a).   
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While there are a lot of critics about the necessity of „keeping the mission alive‟ 
the official EU response to that is twofold:  
 
Firstly, EUBAM Rafah is a good complementarity between physical presence and 
politics. By staying there we make the point that we expect things to change in 
Gaza. Secondly, if we withdraw that is going to be considered as a failure; and 
this is definitely something we don‟t want (European Commission Official, 
interview 11 May 2010).  
 
Although the mission staff would be willing to run some projects such as training 
on border management, human rights, gender issues, customs and capacity building this 
proves to be impossible because of mandate restrictions; possible trainings in Jordan or in 
the West Bank cannot take place because the mission is geographically limited in Rafah. 
At the same time, an EU member state official argues that:  
 
The Agreement on Movement and Access is definitely not implemented by Israel. 
So why should we still implement it and not give the chance to EUBAM Rafah to 
run several projects which would may prove effective in other crossing points in 
the future? (EU member state official, interview 19 May 2010).  
 
 While some pressure has been put upon Israel and Egypt as far as the opening of 
the Rafah crossing is concerned, there seemed to be a refusal on the change of policy at 
least until recently. Although Egypt, after the June 2010 flotilla incident has opened the 
crossing „indefinitely‟, which attracted a lot of publicity, in the words of an EUBAM 
Rafah official:  
 
what has been published these days in the media regarding the opening of the 
border crossing in Rafah is nothing but what has been regular since Rafah was 
closed: From time to time it is opened to allow a very limited number of people to 
leave Gaza in order to receive medical treatment in Egypt. Nothing out of 
“normal”. Like in previous occasions, EUBAM was not deployed. The border 
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remains open but who knows until when. (Martinez, communication 7 June 
2010).  
 
Despite the fact that in the last few months the argument that the border closure 
has failed to achieve its goals and that the overall Gaza blockade policy is „unsustainable‟ 
(Haaretz 2010) the future of EUBAM Rafah is still unclear. Some sources mention that 
“the recent flotilla incident has already brought some changes as everybody speaks now 
about the need to lift the blockade and the EU accepted the principle of actively 
contributing to monitoring the crossings. Rafah first and then Kerem Shalom and re-
opening of Karni” (Member of the office of the Quartet Representative, communication 
12 June 2010). While both the EU and the Quartet Special Representatives Ashton and 
Blair have tried during the second half of 2010 to convince Israel to open the Gaza 
crossing points, such a decision has not been taken yet. The re-opening of the crossings 
was also the main aim of Catherine Ashton‟s first official trip for 2011 in the Middle 
East. Israel asked for the deployment of a new EU-sponsored force which would help 
with the re-opening of the crossings. More specifically, Israeli foreign Minister Avigdor 
Lieberman said in a communique to press after meeting Ashton that:  
 
If you want to bring about a lifting of the closure around Gaza you should take 
responsibility and establish a strong, real and effective force to prevent smuggling 
there ... I can promise you that the minute the smuggling of arms into Gaza stops, 
the closure will be lifted (Rettman 2011). 
 
Until this proposal becomes a reality EUBAM Rafah will remain, in the words of 
Anis Nacrur, Political and Security Sector Adviser at the Office of the Quartet 
Representative “EU‟s sleeping beauty” (Nacrur, interview 31 May 2010). It remains to be 
seen if the international community will be effective in playing the role of prince and 
give to the EUBAM Rafah the kiss which will wake her up from her eternal slumber. 
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5. The EU and Judiciary Sector Reform in the Palestinian Territory 
In 2005, the EU and PA signed an Action Plan in which, among others, they 
agreed on the “establishment of an independent, impartial and fully functioning judiciary 
in line with international standards and strengthen the separation of powers” (European 
Commission 2005). The EU supported the need for developing a strong and independent 
judiciary by the „Empowerment of the Judicial System‟ programme which “addresses the 
most urgent needs of the judiciary through institutional support, development of a 
permanent professional training system, refurbishment of courts and the provision of 
equipment” (European Commission Technical Assistance Office for the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip 2007).  
 The Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (PRDP) which was presented at 
an International Donors‟ Conference in Paris in December 2007 launched the „Justice 
Now‟ reform process with the aim of strengthening the criminal and civil justice system 
and to train and appoint an impartial and efficient judiciary (ECTAO leaflet 2009). The 
PRDP is updated annually by the Ministry of Planning and puts special emphasis on 
government, social development, infrastructure and economic development. The EU  
supported the PRDP with a programme known as „Seyada‟. In the words of a Palestinian 
Official “Seyada is the best project ever taken by the international community which 
seriously takes into consideration the institutional building in the Palestinian Territories” 
(Milhem, interview 24 May 2010). Seyada is a European Commission-run programme 
and its first phase was implemented from 2005 to 2009 with a budget of €3.75 million. 
During this period major programmes were launched by the EU which include the 
establishment of the Palestinian Judicial Training Institute, a permanent professional 
training system; providing legal training for judges and prosecutors and IT training for 
the staff; setting up an inspection department and legal library that supports the High 
Judicial Council; the provision of IT equipment for the judiciary (€1 million additional 
support for this reason). Finally, a 300.000 euro project was supported separately by the 
European Commission to the Birzeit University of law for the development of “Al 
Muqtafi” legislative database and the prototype of a case law database system of all 
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Palestinian court judgements (ECTAO 2009). (European Commission, interview 25 May 
2010). 
Moreover, from 2006 to 2008 Seyada I supported the training department at the 
HJC by conducting numerous ad hoc trainings. Newly appointed judges and prosecutors 
were trained and a „train the trainers‟ programme was also supported and financed by 
Seyada I. Following the installation of a case management system by the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) and the High Judicial Council in the first instance 
courts, Seyada I finalised in 2008 the computerization of the Higher Courts and provided 
the MoJ with necessary hardware for a criminal record system (Seyada II 2009: Annex 
II). The hardware provided in order to improve the electronic case management is called 
Mizan. Its first phase was funded by the European Commission with €600.000 and Mizan 
II, implemented now, aims at providing the necessary hardware for linking all the courts 
with the Ministry of Justice with a budget of  €200.000 (Clausing, interview 25 May 
2010). The establishment of a Law Library located in Ramallah in the HJC was also 
supported by the Seyada I as well as the setting up of an Inspection Office within the 
HJC. Finally, in 2006 and 2007 all court stuff in the Gaza Strip (141) and West Bank 
(185) was trained on basic ECDL skills.   
While Seyada I managed to make distinctive contributions to the Palestinian 
Judiciary Sector Reform (especially if we keep in mind the political situation which 
occurred after Hamas‟ election and the general strike between 2006 and 2007), some 
important weaknesses should also be mentioned. Although the European Commission has 
the reputation of being good with designing programmes and weak with their 
implementation, in the case of Seyada I the design was not that good as it seems that it 
did not take into account the needs of the beneficiary and the realities on the ground 
(Seyada Programme Official, interview 24 May 2010). For example, Seyada I aimed at 
establishing a Constitutional Court but there was neither a political consensus, nor the 
right time for something like that and as a result the HJC was not interested in co-
operation (Clausing, interview 25 May 2010). Moreover, the people working on its 
implementation were mainly contracted internationals who despite the fact that they were 
distinguished professionals, did not have the specific/local knowledge of the real needs of 
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the Palestinian Judiciary Sector. To this end, the necessity of hiring people who have 
knowledge on local developments and needs should always be taken into account.   
As a result, the European Commission seems to have drawn lessons and Seyada II 
which is being implemented at the moment (2009-2012) has started with a completely 
new staff comprised by only 1 European team leader and the rest is local staff. Seyada II, 
with around a €4 million budget is a “demand driven process and responds to the 
objectives of the PA‟s „Justice Now Programme‟ in the Palestinian Reform and 
Development Plan (PRDP)” (ibid.). Its overall objective is to  
develop a more independent, impartial, efficient, professional, transparent 
and modern justice system through institutional strengthening and capacity 
building of the judiciary and the bar association, and to support the proper 
functioning of the courts, while preserving the freedoms and fundamental 
rights of citizens by ensuring a fair trial, including the right to access to 
justice and the right to defence (Seyada Office, Information Brochure).  
 
Seyada II is implemented by a consortium led by ICON-INSTITUT Public Sector 
GmbH and including the Belgian Development cooperation agency (BTC-CTB) and the 
Centre for International Legal Cooperation (CILC) (Lentze, interview 23 May 2010). It 
has five components which include institutional building in a) HJC by supporting its 
Inspection Office‟s work in quality control and by assisting its Technical Office in 
compiling and publishing court judgements, b) Palestinian Judicial Institute (PJI) by 
developing a judicial training system for judges and public prosecutors and a two-year 
Judicial Studies Diploma Programme, c) Palestinian Bar Association (PBA), d) Legal aid 
so as all Palestinians to be able to access justice regardless of their financial means and e) 
Constitutional Review. (Seyada Office, Information Brochure). Last but not least, Seyada 
II is funding the establishment of seven Law Libraries within the courts in Hebron, 
Bethlehem, Jericho, Nablus, Qalqilya, Toulkarem and Jenin for the use of judges, 
prosecutors and lawyers at the same time providing training on their use. 
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The PA has now with the help of the international community recruited and 
trained substantial numbers of new judges and prosecutors and has built new courts in 
Jenin, Nablus, Bethlehem and Jericho. As a sign of growing public confidence, the 
number of cases being referred to the courts has also grown rapidly and the courts have 
been able to deal with influx and make some inroads into the substantial "backlog" 
which accumulated in worse times.  Seyada I‟s role to this was instrumental as it 
facilitated the successful completion of entering 13.500 of backlogged cases into a 
unified database available in all public prosecution offices in the West Bank.   
As far as the situation of JSR in Gaza is concerned things remain the same as with 
the rest of the state-building project there; everything has stopped. This is confirmed by 
the recent ENP Country Progress Report for the Occupied Palestinian Territory published 
in May 2010 which states that: “the reforms were limited to institutions in the West Bank, 
and could not be implemented in Gaza where the PA has de facto no authority” 
(European Commission 2010). Consequently, the Seyada office in Gaza had to be closed 
following the broader EU policy towards Hamas and the latter established a parallel 
structure throughout the Gaza Strip, including institutions like a Judicial Training 
Institute. A large majority of judges refused to continue working with the Hamas-
established government and they are currently being paid by the PA government in the 
West Bank. 
As mentioned in the previous part, EUPOL COPPS, since September 2008 has a 
Rule of Law Section to assist the Palestinian Justice System and the penitentiary sector. 
But, while Seyada and EUPOL COPPS were supposed to co-operate “through exchange 
and sharing of information concerning planned activities like trainings and conferences, 
and regular meetings so as to reinforce enhanced EU action in the justice sector in 
Palestine” (Seyada II 2009: Annex II) that was not the case in reality. It seems that 
competences between the European Commission and the European Council in Brussels 
level were well transferred on the two EU “missions” on the ground. As a rule of law 
expert in the EUPOL COPPS argues: “We do not work hand in hand. From the beginning 
Seyada had a broader mandate while the rule of law mandate is more clear and specific” 
(EUPOL COPPS Headquarters, interview 28 May 2010). On the other hand, officials 
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from Seyada argue that “the mandate of the rule of law section was not clear and there 
was a lot of tension between the European Commission and the European Council in 
Brussels” (European Commission, interview 25 May 2010). Some others added EUPOL 
COPPS‟ unwillingness and arrogance as reasons of no co-operation between them. 
(Seyada Programme Official, interview 24 May 2010). It is true that the rule of law 
section of EUPOL COPPS started wrong, with 20 experts but without tools, budget and 
more specifically, locals. Things started improving in 2010 and this is mainly due to the 
appointment of a new Head of the rule of law section who demonstrated the willingness 
to work closer with Seyada (European Commission, interview 25 May 2010). It seems 
that some cooperation has only recently started with the aim of creating a unified „EU 
block‟. A project initiated by EUPOL COPPS for Juvenile Justice which is of a €3 
million cost is co-funded by the European Commission. According to Feras Milhem 
“EUPOL COPPS and Seyada can form a strong coalition and demonstrate that as EU, we 
are stronger when we are together” (Milhem, interview 24 May 2010).    
 
 
6. Assessment of the European Union’s Contribution to the Security Sector Reform 
in the Palestinian Territory 
Both EU civilian missions initially produced positive results. EUBAM Rafah was 
instrumental at substantially increasing the flow of persons between Egypt and Gaza and 
EUPOL COPPS commenced refurbishing the Jericho Training Center a facility of big 
importance for the Palestinian Civil Police (CITpax 2006: 5). EUBAM Rafah until its 
suspension in the summer of 2007 was considered to be the most successful CFSP (now 
called CSDP mission) because it managed to be deployed rapidly, it made a difference on 
the ground, it gave the EU visibility at a comparatively low cost and it established an 
important precedent (Bulut 2009: 307). More significantly, because of its non-executive 
mandate the mission achieved local ownership at a significant level; it was the Palestinian 
security and customs officials who did the actual work at the crossing while the EU 
mission officials were helping, advising and supervising the process. This was a wise 
choice for the EU in every aspect; on the one hand the risks of failure were reduced 
because of the limited mandate and on the other hand the EU had a “clean hands” 
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approach which means that it would not have to take any actual responsibility. An EU 
Commission official argues that “the Israelis wanted the Europeans to take full 
responsibility but Europeans did not want to risk being blamed for tunnels” (European 
Commission official, interview 14 May 2010). 
Due to circumstances on the ground, which were mentioned in the previous 
sections, EUBAM Rafah has not been operational for almost four years. While the 
majority of the European officials are in favour of keeping the mission alive arguing that 
“the presence of the mission is symbolic that the EU considers the situation temporary 
(Council of the European Union, interview 4 February 2010), that the mission 
“demonstrates the EU‟s commitment to the resolution of the conflict and it provides 
visibility” (Council of the European Union, interview 2 February 2010) and that 
“EUBAM Rafah is still there because it demonstrates the EU‟s continuous readiness to 
follow possible progress on the ground” (British Representation, interview 10 March 
2010) at the same time it seems that there is not enough pressure from the EU to Egypt 
and Israel in order to open the Rafah crossing point. (European Commission, interview 
11 February 2010). Additionally, there is the fear that “if the mission closes then it will 
not be possible to deploy there again” (European Commission, interview 12 February 
2010; EUBAM Rafah Officials, interview 13 May 2010). Some other EU officials argue 
in favour of the political meaning of the mission. Anis Nacrour, Political and Security 
Advisor to the Quarter Representative Tony Blair, says that he would personally see it as 
a setback if EUBAM Rafah was pulled out, because this is the first time that the EU is so 
actively involved in important security issues in the conflict (Persson 2010: 51). After all 
says Nacrour, EUBAM Rafah is about border control, which is one of the conflict‟s final 
status issues (ibid.). 
On the other hand there are also well founded criticisms as far as the need of 
keeping the mission is concerned. A European Parliament official argues that “Rafah is a 
mess. The argument that EUBAM Rafah is there because the EU wants to express its 
belief that this is a temporary situation is completely stupid. There are more meaningful 
ways to express this policy” (European Parliament, interview 12 February 2010). Another 
European Parliament official speaking about the “visibility” argument poses the 
following question: “What kind of visibility is this? Since when is having cars locked into 
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a garage considered to be visibility?” (European Parliament, interview 25 February 
2010). Along the same lines of the argument, an EU member state official in Jerusalem 
argues that “EUBAM Rafah is only important from the symbolic point of view. In our 
capital, these missions are seen as really important. For us who are here, these missions 
seem a bit exaggerated. EUBAM Rafah‟s reputation is really bad now”. (European Union 
member state official, interview 19 May 2010).  
While both arguments are of importance it should be mentioned that although the 
reasons for not closing down the mission are of political nature, in reality the EU does not 
put any meaningful political pressure on the parties concerned regarding the need of 
reactivating EUBAM Rafah. Catherine Ashton, following the flotilla fiasco, declared 
that:  
 
The humanitarian situation in Gaza remains a source of grave concern. The EU 
does not accept the continued policy of closure. It is unacceptable and politically 
counterproductive. We need to urgently achieve a durable solution to the situation 
in Gaza. The EU underlines its call for an immediate, sustained and unconditional 
opening of crossings for the flow of humanitarian aid, commercial goods and 
persons to and from Gaza (Ashton 2010).  
 
  
More recently, in January 2011, Catherine Ashton expressed again the EU‟s 
readiness to help to crossing point arrangements. 
 
I have reiterated the EU's commitment to help and have discussed with both 
Israelis and Palestinians how to take forward the EU's comprehensive package of 
support, which includes improvements to the crossings infrastructure, equipment 
and training for the Palestinian Authority (PA) border and crossings personnel 
(Ashton 2011). 
 
In this respect, EUBAM Rafah can be seen as a glimpse of the future in the sense 
that if enough political pressure is put then we could witness similar arrangements at 
Israel‟s borders. Another incentive for the EU would also be to adopt a more innovative 
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policy towards Gaza and “deploy a European naval mission to monitor the international 
and Palestinian waters along Gaza, just as the UN does off the coast of Lebanon” 
(Reigeluth and Bouris 2010). Either as a part of reactivating EUBAM Rafah or as a 
separate CSDP mission, the EU could deploy this maritime force in order to lift the siege 
in Gaza. Such a force “would be a courageous step for Brussels to ensure Israeli security, 
Palestinian trade and avoiding other unnecessary flotilla incidents while also advancing a 
more comprehensive approach to SSR” (Bouris 2010a). 
As far as EUPOL COPPS is concerned it is characterized as “a good success 
story” (Berger, interview 14 May 2010). Although the mission started its operation in a 
very difficult environment given the facts on the ground that followed Hamas‟s electoral 
win and the international community‟s policies, it has managed to make “tangible and 
concrete contributions to the Security Sector in the PT” (Council of the European Union, 
interview 2 February 2010). The mission seems to have the support of all parties 
concerned despite the fact that “training police under occupation is a very ugly business” 
(Council of the European Union, interview 8 March 2010). EU officials argue that 
“EUPOL COPPS have done a great job” (European Commission, interview 11 February 
2010) and that “EUPOL COPPS matches the scope of the Fayyad plan and the shift to the 
rule of law and judiciary is a political signal” (Council of the European Union, interview 
12 February 2010). Israeli officials also seem satisfied with the mission. “EUPOL 
COPPS seems quite successful until now and it is a good example on how the EU can 
contribute positively on the ground” argues an Israeli official in Brussels (Israeli official, 
interview 11 March 2010). Another Israeli official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
in Jerusalem also argues that “the situation is much better now and this is because 
EUPOL COPPS‟ success” (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, interview 12 May 2010).  
The mission has now been expanded to include a rule of law component in order 
to establish a more comprehensive approach to security for Palestinians (EUPOL COPPS 
Information Brochure 2009). Although this has been a positive step from Brussels some 
weaknesses should be mentioned. First of all, the expansion took place without a proper 
planning and without a clear mandate (European Commission, interview 25 May 2010).  
As a result there have been a lot of critics that they were not properly equipped for such a 
role and they were not capable of doing serious developmental work (European 
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Commission, interview 20 May 2010).  An EU official argues that “the rule of law 
section started really wrong consisting if 20 experts but without tools, without badget and 
most importantly…without locals” (European Commission, interview 24 May 2010). 
Some others, such as Anis Nacrur and Christian Berger prefer to keep a distance from 
these critics and argue that it‟s too early to measure the rule of law section achievements 
and it would be immature to judge (Nacrur, interview 31 May 2010; Berger, interview 14 
May 2010). While different perspectives exist, we could argue that in general EUPOL 
COPPS is probably trying to do much more than they should and that transferring 
experience from Europe to the Middle East and more specifically to the PT does not 
always work.  
The lack of local ownership has been one more criticism to EUPOL COPPS. 
From a number of interviews it is revealed that at least in the beginning of the mission‟s 
deployment its officials were trying to impose their models of running of a civilian 
police. “They were not really deeply linked with the Palestinian Police” says an EU 
official in Jerusalem while some others go as further as to argue that “they were quite 
arrogant and isolated without taking into account the principle of ownership and the 
Palestinian needs” (PLO official, interview 22 May 2010).  
As far as the JSR is concerned before evaluating the EU‟s performance, a number 
of external and internal challenges should be mentioned. First and foremost one has to 
bear in mind that Palestine is a “nonstate”, whereby its sovereignty, the capacity of 
governance institutions and the rights of its citizens, are seriously constrained by the 
presence of an occupying power. As a result, the Palestinian judiciary is working under 
limited sovereignty, within a framework of agreements that restrict a number of 
jurisdictions, an unstable security environment dominated by the Israeli occupation and 
political instability in general (Palestinian National Authority, High Judicial Council 
2010). The Israeli occupation in particular had severe effects on the functioning of the 
judiciary during these years. The insulting of judges by the IDF in checkpoints and 
movement restrictions applied in the PT had as a result the judges often not being able to 
arrive to their work. Moreover, destruction of infrastructure and prisons as well as the 
closure restrictions and the limits on where the Palestinian police can or cannot go have 
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further complicated the judiciary sector as for example police is unable to move detainees 
from one court to another (ibid.).  
Internal challenges include a really low budget on behalf of the PNA towards the 
judiciary sector which is only 0.37 per cent of the total budget (ibid.). Consequently, low 
salaries do not provide judges with financial incentives and this leads to the inability of 
attracting new judges and developing their skills. The lack of infrastructure to 
accommodate the necessary institutions and people as well as the inability to maintain 
them constitute two more fundamental problems that the judiciary in the PT should deal 
with.  
While the judiciary sector reform in the Palestinian Territory seems to be on the 
right track and the EU‟s contribution to it is significant, a number of problems 
confronting the judiciary remain in place. It is true that due to shortage of judges and in 
some cases their unwillingness to work as many hours as required, an enormous backlog 
of cases remains despite the improvement of the situation. Although more judges have 
been appointed during the last three years they are still not enough to address the backlog 
(Aman Transparency Palestine 2009). Moreover, a large number of these appointments 
were made on the basis of favoritism and nepotism rather than objective criteria. Finally, 
the weakness of the executive to be fast to execute the rulings of the courts has further 
complicated the situation.  
The lack of coordination among the numerous donors and projects should also be 
mentioned as an important factor which has not helped the judiciary sector reform in the 
Palestinian Territory despite their good intentions. In light of this, better coordination is 
needed between the different actors trying to reform the judiciary sector in the Palestinian 
Territory such as the European Commission with Seyada, the European Council with 
EUPOL COPPS and its rule of law component, the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Netherlands 
Representative Office (NRO) with its development cooperation programme which 
focuses on the criminal justice system and the Local Aid Coordination Secretariat 
(LACS) just to name a few. 
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Better coordination is not only needed among these actors but also between the 
European Commission and the European Council if the EU wants to become a really 
effective, competitive and comprehensive actor in the Judiciary Sector Reform in the 
Palestinian Territory. Although it is true that the EU has played an important role in this 
domain mainly with the Seyada project, there is still a big room for improvement. 
Overall, despite the fact that Seyada has made tangible contributions to judiciary sector 
reform in the Palestinian Territory as it responded to specific needs of the PRDP and took 
into account the local needs unlike other projects which aimed only at “scoring points” 
(Seyada Programme Official, interview 24 May 2010), it has also had a few weaknesses 
especially in its first phase. Coordination and cooperation between Seyada and the Rule 
of Law section of EUPOL COPPS is crucial in terms of coherence. While Seyada is 
working on judiciary reform, EUPOL COPPS is working on the whole chain of the 
criminal justice system and there should be complementarity between them rather than 
competition.    
 
Conclusion     
Security Sector Reform has become the „alpha and omega‟ of the state-building 
process in general and in the Palestinian Territory in particular. “The security argument 
by the Israelis has been there since ever and it is the only argument that we have bought 
in with such a big willingness” argues an EU member state official in Jerusalem 
(European Union member state official, interview 19 May 2010). The main question 
should thus be “security for whom”?  
Since the Oslo Accords and the actual creation of the Palestinian Police Force 
(PPF) the aim was one: the PPF‟s central goal would be to ensure law and order in the 
West Bank and Gaza strip while preventing any attacks on Israeli settlers and troops. This 
was the reason behind Israel‟s willingness to allow the expansion of the PPF from 9.000, 
agreed in 1994, to 30.000 under Oslo II (Sayigh 2000). Consequently, when we refer to 
security sector reform in the Palestinian Territory we mean „reform‟ that would enhance 
Israel‟s security first and secondly Palestinian internal security. “When the Palestinians 
take care of our security, this is the best kind of security arrangement we can achieve” 
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argues a former senior Israeli defence official (International Crisis Group 2010: 17). Thus 
the central aim was to “produce a system of Palestinian policing too weak to constitute a 
danger [but] strong enough to confront the „infrastructure of terror‟” (Friendrich and 
Luethold 2007: 12). 
As a result, since Oslo and in subsequent agreements such as the Roadmap, the 
need for working hand in hand with the IDF has become a pre-requisite for the PA. 
Although Prime Minister Fayyad puts forward the argument that “by working in tandem 
with Israel to bring back security, Palestinians can gain the international community‟s 
and Israel‟s confidence, neutralise a key Israeli argument against statehood and thus pave 
the way for independence” (International Crisis Group 2010: i) in reality the Palestinian 
security services have long been criticized as cooperating with their occupier. “The line 
between cooperation and collaboration is a thin one, which poses a virtually 
insurmountable challenge for the PSF‟s efforts to win Palestinian hearts and minds” 
argues a recent ICG Report (ibid.: 36). At the same time, IDF‟s late night humiliating 
incursions into Palestinian cities and villages as well as strict limitations imposed to the 
PSF by the IDF “undermine the symbols and reality of indigenous empowerment” (ibid: 
i). 
Moreover, the EU has not followed a comprehensive SSR approach as far as the 
PT is concerned mainly because it was never one of the actors who defined what SSR 
means and should aim at in the Palestinian context. Although SSR is considered to be a 
part of a broader state-building project and it has come to “resemble both a first and a last 
step in international statebuilding operations” (Boas and Stig 2010: 290), yet in practice 
the EU has approached it quite single-handedly. The prioritization of technical assistance 
and training, although important, has weakened an effective SSR where political 
initiatives should have been taken in order to bring security under democratic control. 
Thus, while the EU has provided technical support and training, this was targeted toward 
counterterrorist capabilities rather than genuine SSR. Human Rights Watch concluded in 
2008 that “the focus of outside support is clearly on strengthening the forces loyal to 
Abbas as a counter-weight to Hamas, despite the abuses that these forces routinely 
commit” (Human Rights Watch 2008: 10). 
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 And here comes another EU inconsistency; while the EU has strongly supported 
the rule of law perspective in the Palestinian SSR, at least in theory, in reality the EU has 
not paid much attention to helping the improvement of democratic civilian oversight and 
accountability. “The rule of law cannot be established in the absence of a functioning 
parliament and judicial system” (Sayigh 2009: 3) argues Yezid Sayigh, one of the leading 
writers on SSR, and he is right. While the EU is trying to establish the rule of law at the 
same time it faces a democratic deficit as it should not be neglected that since 2007 the 
leading Palestinian Government under Salam Fayyad is an emergency one and not 
democratically elected. This means that all new laws have been issued under Presidential 
decree. As a result the true meaning of accountability and oversight has been eluded. In 
other words, as Prof. Sayigh puts it bluntly “official US and EU discourse promoting 
democratic governance and human rights describes more a virtual reality than actual 
policy” (ibid. 25). 
Thus, while a fundamental problem of political legitimacy exists in the West 
Bank, the same is not true with regard to Hamas‟s rule in Gaza. Hamas has been able to 
adopt a form of uncontested control within the borders in Gaza where policies are applied 
throughout. As Yezid Sayigh argued in a recent talk at LSE “Hamas‟s form of control 
which we associate with sovereign states is totally non-existent in the West Bank. In 
many respects what Hamas has achieved in Gaza looks much more like a state than 
anything in the West Bank” (Sayigh 2010). And this is true. The Weberian definition of a 
state which has been broadly accepted by the international community, argues that the 
state should have the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force/power within a 
given territory.  
To sum up, while there has been an important progress on the front of SSR with 
regard to the Palestinian Territory, the pitfall has been that the overall EU approach is 
mainly technical while it should be a fundamentally political one. As mentioned in the 
introduction, SSR is supposedly part of a broader peace/state-building framework but in 
the case of the PT it has been approached quite single-handedly. While the reform has 
reached a number of technical benchmarks the holistic approach and the political aspect 
have been neglected. Even though the EU and the international community are expecting 
the PA to govern in accordance with the principles of democratic governance at the same 
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time themselves do not feel obliged to adhere to the very same principle. Finally, the lack 
of decisions at “high politics” level can be considered the main obstacle to the SSR in the 
PT. While the PA has made good progress and has adhered to its Roadmap obligations, 
Israel has done little in order to fulfill its own. As a recently leaked Palestine paper 
demonstrates, the PA has either completely fulfilled or working to fulfill its obligations 
while Israel has yet to complete any (Al Jazeera 2011). Consequently, no major progress 
with regard to SSR is expected, until the EU and the international community press Israel 
to adhere to its Roadmap obligations and promote a more genuine and holistic approach 
to SSR.          
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